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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-
3(2)(h), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee asserts that the correct standard of review for the issues presented 
by the Appellant are as follows: 
A. Whether the Trial Court properly concluded that Karen Wood is a 
creditor of the Estate of Raymond Wood? 
Standard of Review. Generally the standard of Review of the Trial Court's 
granting of summary judgment is based upon a standard of correctness, See Pigs 
Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 43 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002). In the event the Court 
determines that Karen Wood was a creditor of the Estate of Raymond Wood, then 
Judge Halliday's Order denying Karen Wood's creditor claim signed the 101h day of 
August, 2001, becomes the law of the case inasmuch as there has been no appeal of 
said decision. 
In the event the Court determines that Karen Wood is not a creditor of 
the Estate of Raymond Wood, then pursuant to the Decree of Divorce filed Aprill4, 
1987 the real property was awarded to Raymond Wood which Decree was not 
appealed by Karen Wood and becomes the law of the case. 
B. Whether the Probate Court was without jurisdiction to determine 
Karen Wood's Quiet Title claim to her residence and real property? 
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Standard of Review. Generally the Trial Court's granting of summary 
judgment is reviewed on the basis of correctness. See Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete 
County, 43 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002). However, at the time Judge Halliday entered the 
Ruling on Summary Judgment both the Probate case and the Quiet Title action had 
been consolidated and consequently Judge Halliday was presiding as the Judge over 
the Quiet Title action as well as the Probate action at the time of the ruling on 
summary judgement. 
C. Whether the issue of Karen Wood's interest in her residence and real 
property was res judicata? 
Standard of Review. The Trial Court's granting of summary judgment is 
reviewed on the basis of correctness. See Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 43 P.3d 
379 (Utah 2002). 
D. Whether the Probate Court had jurisdiction to determine the issues in 
the Quiet Title action? 
Standard of Review. It appears that this issue is the same as issue B above. 
E. Whether the divorce proceeding severed the joint tenancy and the 
right of survivorship or specifically preserved the joint tenancy and survivorship to 
secure the payment of Karen Wood's equity to her? 
Standard of Review. Correctness. See Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 43 
P .3d 379 (Utah 2002) 
F. Whether there was a disputed issue of material fact precluding the 
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grant of summary judgment? 
Standard of Review. The Appellate Court reviews the Trial Court's granting 
of summary judgment on the basis of correctness. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 
43 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002) 
G. Whether the Quiet Title action should have been consolidated with the 
Probate action? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review for the Trial Court's granting of 
the Motion to Consolidate is an abuse of discretion standard. Parker v. Parker, 996 
P.2d 565 (Utah Appeals 2000). It should be noted that the Notice of Appeal does 
not provide notice of Appellant's desire to appeal Judge Bryner's Order 
consolidating the Probate and Quiet Title action. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Most of the statements made in Appellant's Brief under this same heading are 
accurate. The following statements, however, Appellee asserts are inaccurately 
stated. 
A. Appellant at page 2 paragraph 4 of her brief states: 
The real property remained in joint tenancy following the 
divorce because Raymond Wood did not pay Karen Wood her equity 
in the marital property. (R 35-37, 43) 
Said statement is a legal conclusion, stated by Appellant, and is the very issue 
this Court is called upon to decide and for which Colleen Wood personal 
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representative of Raymond Wood Estate asserts that the divorce proceedings 
severed the joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The following additional facts 
are pertinent to the issue. 
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce which splits the personal property 
reads as follows: 
5. That the marital assets be divided between the parties as 
follows: 
A. To Defendant: the 1974 mobile home and the real property 
located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the indebtedness 
thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the indebtedness 
thereon; the 197 5 Dodge 4-wheel drive pickup truck; 1978 51h wheel 
camp trailer; the Century boats; the 1982 Honda ATC 3-wheeler; the 
dirt bike; the snowmobiles; and a portion of the furniture and 
furnishings. 
B. To Plaintiff: the 1978 Subaru automobile; a portion of the 
furniture and furnishings; Plaintiffs personal belongings and those of 
the minor children. 
C. That Plaintiff shall and hereby is granted judgment against 
Defendant in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($1 0,000.00), the 
same being approximately one-half of the equity in those items 
outlined herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said judgment shall 
earn interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. (Quiet Title R. 33, 
Addendum A) 
The parties later entered into a subsequent Stipulation, a copy of which is 
attached as Addendum A. The Stipulation reads in pertinent part as follows: 
1. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of$5,600.00 
payable $2,000.00 on or before April15, 1997 with the balance of 
$3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 the first payment being 
due on or before April 30,1997 and like payments being due on or 
before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payment shall be 
made by direct deposit from Defendant's bank account into Plaintiffs 
account and Defendant shall bear all costs associated with the 
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arranging of said deposits. 
2. As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made, 
no interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance due. In the event 
any payment is not timely made; interest at the annual rate of 12% 
shall computed from the date of this agreement and Plaintiff, upon 
filing of an affidavit with the Court that payments have not been timely 
made, shall be entitled to judgment against Defendant for the balance 
owed, including accrued interest and attorney's fees incurred in the 
preparation and filing of the Affidavit and judgment. Prior to filing an 
Affidavit with the Court set forth in this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give 
to Defendant ten (10) days advance written notice of the delinquency. 
3. Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall 
place with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed 
Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in the parties' 
Decree of Divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the Deed to 
Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or to a Title 
Company within the event said Deed is necessary to enable Defendant 
to refinance his property in order to satisfy his obligations hereunder. 
4. Upon the execution of this Stipulation, Defendant's 
Petition to Modify and Petitioner's Counter Petition, Amended 
Counter Petition and Order to Show Cause shall be dismissed and a 
Trial date now scheduled for Friday, February 7, 1997 be vacated. 
5. Each party hereby releases the other from any and all 
obligations that may exist, or may, in the future, exist under the terms 
of the parties' Decree of Divorce or any subsequent modification 
thereto. (Quiet Title R. 35-37) 
B. At page 2 paragraph 6 of Appellant's Brief, she states: 
At the time ofhis death Raymond Wood had not paid Karen Wood the 
judgment for her equity in the real property .... 
Appellant asserts the following pertinent facts relating thereto. Judge Halliday in 
the probate matter at page 138-139 of the record entered an Order denying 
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creditor's alleged claim on the lOth day of August, 2001. Pursuant to the Order to 
deny creditor's alleged claim Judge Halliday ordered: 
1. Respondent's Motion for leave to late file a 
memorandum in opposition is denied due to the fact that Karen Wood 
has had sufficient time in which to retain an attorney to file an 
objection to the personal representatives Motion to Deny Creditor's 
Claim. 
2. The time to file an objection has run and Respondent has 
not filed an objection to the personal representative's motion. 
3. The personal representative filed a Notice to All 
Creditors in the Emery County progress and Ms. Karen Wood did not 
file a claim as required by Section 75-3-801(1) ofUCA. 
4. Ms. Karen Wood's alleged claim that the Estate of 
Raymond D. Wood owes her money is denied. 
5. The personal representative is entitled to her attorney's 
fees. 
6. Karen Wood is ordered to have Michael Harris release 
the Deed of Trust. (Probate R: 114-115) 
Karen Wood did not file an appeal ofthe Court's denial ofher Creditors 
claim. (Probate R: 1-176) 
C. Appellant asserts at page 3 paragraph 3 of their Brief as follows: 
The probate record has no proof that Notice to Creditors was 
given or published as required by UCA §75-3-801. R. 1-176. 
Appellant asserts the following facts in relation thereto. 
The Appellant did not raise the issue as part of the summary judgment and 
consequently did not preserve that issue for appeal. (Quiet Title R: 1-1 05) 
Judge Halliday in its Order to Deny Creditors alleged claim dated August 10, 
2001 specifically states: 
3. The personal representative filed a Notice to All 
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Creditors in the Emery County progress and Ms. Karen Wood did not 
file a claim as required by Section 75-3-801(1) ofUCA. (Probate R: 
114-115) 
D. At page 6, 6111 line from the top, Appellant states as follows: 
The Memorandum acknowledged that Raymond Wood had not 
paid Karen Wood the monies which were a condition precedent to the 
delivery of the Quit Claim Deed to Raymond Wood from Karen 
Wood's counsel Michael Harrison. R. 27, in Quiet Title action. 
Appellant asserts that the actual language at page 27 of the Record reads as 
follows: 
Although it is unclear whether Raymond Wood paid all of the 
money he was obligated to pay Karen Wood, (it is clear that the most 
he would have owed was $3,600.00) Karen Wood was given the 
opportunity to present a claim against the Estate of Raymond D. 
Wood, but rather chose not to make that claim as required by statute. 
(Quiet Title R:27) 
E. At page 7, first paragraph Karen Wood asserts: 
Karen Wood executed a Quit Claim Deed which was to be held 
by her counsel, Michael A. Harrison, for delivery to Raymond Wood 
upon full payment of Karen Wood's equity in the home and real 
property in order to "intentionally preserve and protect Karen Wood's 
interest in the home and real property" R 41-45, 46-65, 65-85. 
Appellee asserts the following facts: 
The parties entered into a written Stipulation, the complete copy of which is 
attached is Addendum A (Quiet Title R:35-37). No where in the Stipulation is there 
a provision providing for Karen Wood to have a continued interest in the home and 
real property but rather at most a lien against the real propetiy to secure a payment 
of the amount set out therein. (Quiet Title R:35-37) 
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The Stipulation specifically provides for the remedy to Karen Wood in the 
event there is a default in the payment of the monies which is contained in paragraph 
2 which reads as follows: 
In the event any payment is not timely made, interest at the 
annual rate of 12% shall be computed from the date ofthis agreement 
and Plaintiff, upon filing of an Affidavit with the Court that payments 
have not been timely made, shall be entitled to judgment against the 
Defendant for the balance owed including accrued interest and 
attorney's fees incurred in the preparation and filing of the Affidavit 
and judgment. Prior to filing an Affidavit with the Court as set forth in 
this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give to Defendant advance written notice 
of the delinquency. (Quiet Title R: 35-37) 
The Stipulation provided for $2,000.00 payment paid on or before April15, 1997 
and the balance of $3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 beginning April30, 
1997. If all of the payments were timely made, the final payment would have been 
made on or before March 30,2000. (Quiet Title R: 35-37) Raymond Wood did not 
pass away until July 17, 2000 (Probate R: 1) which would have been nearly four 
months after the scheduled final payment pursuant to the parties' Stipulation. 
In addition, the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the stipulation in the Divorce 
proceedings specifically acknowledges that Raymond Wood was awarded the 
property in 1he Decree of Divorce. The pertinent portion of paragraph 3 of the 
Stipulation reads as follows: 
Upon the execution of this Agreement, Plaintiff shall place 
with her attorney Michael A. Harrison an original executed Quit Claim 
Deed to the property awarded to the Defendant in the parties' Decree 
of Divorce. (Emphasis added.) (Quiet Title R: 35-37) 
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F. Appellant's assertions under the heading "Statement of the Facts" read nearly 
verbatim to the statements under the heading "Statement of the Case"with the 
exception of the second to the last paragraph of the Statement of Fact which reads: 
The Trial Court in Quiet Title action granted the personal 
representatives Motion for Consolidation on January 22, 2003, R. 98. 
On January 22, 2003, the probate court granted the personal 
representative's Motion for Summary Judgment upon the basis that 
the decision in the probate matter is res judicata upon the issues 
raised in Karen Wood's Quiet Title action. The Probate Court ruled 
that Karen Wood became a creditor of Raymond Wood when she 
agreed to a sum certain in the divorce action and that "All of her 
rights, title or interest, in the property were modified from a property 
interest to a secured creditor's interest." The Probate Court then 
ruled that Karen Wood "failed to timely perfect a creditor's claim 
[which] now prevents her from seeking to do indirectly what she was 
prevented from doing directly." The Probate Court granted the 
personal representative's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissed the Quiet Title action of Karen Wood. R. 100-102. 
The Probate Court was not the Court who entered the ruling on summary 
judgment. Judge Halliday was sitting as the presiding judge over both the Probate 
case as well as the Quiet Title action at the time he entered the ruling on summary 
judgment. 
The following portions ofthe record reflect the status of the Court at the 
time of the ruling on summary judgment. 
Pursuant to an Order on Order to Show Cause entered by Judge Halliday in 
the probate case on the 291h of October, 2002, it reads in pertinent part: 
1. The Court recognizes there is an associated case with 
Karen Wood wherein Karen Wood has filed a Quiet Title action which 
bears case number 0107700169 and is set before Judge Bryner. 
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2. The Court recognizes that Colleen Wood has filed a 
motion asking Judge Bryner to consolidate the Quiet Title action into 
this probate action and further has filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
3. Until Judge Bryner rules on the Motion to Consolidate, 
this Court will not enter a ruling with regard to the Quiet Title action, 
but merely will leave the prior rulings of this Court in place until the 
Motion to Consolidate has been ruled upon by Judge Bryner (probate 
record 172-173). 
On the 191h day of December, 2002, Judge Bryner signed his ruling on the 
Motion to Consolidate which is contained at Quiet Title record page 98 which reads, 
The motion to consolidate the above entitled case with probate 
no. 00370013EI is granted in order to maintain a consistency. The 
Motion for Summary Judgment shall be ruled on by the Honorable 
Bruee K. Halliday of the Seventh District Court who is hearing the 
said probate case. R. 98. 
Judge Halliday in his order of dismissal contained Quiet Title Record at page 
1 00 and 10 1 states in pertinent part: 
"Judge Bryce K. Bryner has ordered this case No. 010700169 
hereinafter No. 169, consolidated with probate case No. 00370013, 
hereafter No. 13, and has requested that the Judge handling the later 
case, in an attempt to expedite efficient handling of the cases, rule on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in Case No. 169. The 
Court has reviewed the pleadings, reviewed the decision which it made 
in the probate matter, and concludes that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds of the decision in the probate matter was and 
is res judicata as to the ultimate issues raised in Plaintiffs Petition to 
Quiet Title should be granted. I conclude that Case No. 169 is merely 
an effort on the part of the Plaintiff to circumvent the Order in Case 
No. 13 and avoid the operation ofthe statute of limitations question 
which underlies the decision in the probate matter. To allow such an 
effort would be a contravention of equity and justice herein. R. 100. 
The following is a list of the facts set out in Colleen Wood's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment (a complete copy of the motion, memorandum and exhibits are 
attached as Addendum A) and forms the basis upon which summary judgment was 
granted. 
1. On April14, 1987, a Decree of Divorce was entered by the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of Emery County, wherein the PlaintiffKaren Wood, was 
granted a Decree of Divorce against Raymond D. Wood (now deceased). See 
attached copy ofthe Decree ofDivorce. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, paragraph SA, it reads: 
A. To Defendant [Raymond Wood]: The 1974 mobile home and 
real property located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the 
indebtedness thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the 
indebtedness thereon; the Dodge fourwheel drive pick -up truck; the 
1978 fifth-wheel camp trailer; the Century boat; the 1982 Honda ATV 
three-wheeler; the dirt bike; the snowmobile; and a portion of the 
furniture and furnishings. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
3. In exchange Karen Wood was awarded, pursuant to the Decree of 
Divorce, judgment in the amount of$10,000.00. Paragraph 5C of the Decree of 
Divorce reads: 
C. That Plaintiff [Karen Wood] shall and hereby is granted judgment 
against defendant in the amount ofTEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000), 
the same being approximately one-half of the equity in those items outlined 
herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said judgment shall earn interest at 
the statutory rate until paid in full. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
4. Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, issues arose 
between Karen Wood and Raymond Wood regarding the payment of the judgment 
entered pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and each of them filed Petitions with the 
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District Court in the divorce case to have their rights asserted. (Quiet Title R: 21-
22) 
5. The parties then entered into a Stipulation which resolved the 
competing petitions to modify. (A copy of the stipulation is attached). Paragraphs 1 
and 3 reads: 
1. Defendant [Raymond Wood] shall pay to Plaintiff [Karen Wood] the 
sum of$5,600.00 payable $2,000.00 on or before Aprill5, 1997 with the 
balance of $3,600.00 in monthly payments of $100.00 the first payment 
being due on or before April30, 1997 and like payments being due on or 
before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payments shall be made by 
direct deposit from Defendant's bank account into plaintiff's bank account 
and defendant shall bear all costs associated with the arranging of said 
deposits. 
3 Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall place 
with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed Quit Claim 
Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in the parties' decree of divorce. 
Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the deed to Defendant upon payment of all 
sums due hereunder or to a title company within the event said deed is 
necessary to enable Defendant to refinance his property in order to satisfy 
his obligation hereunder. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
6. Pursuant to paragraph 5of the Stipulation entered into by the parties in 
April of 1997, it states: 
Each party hereby releases the other from any and all other 
obligations that may exist or may, in the future, exist under the terms 
of the parties' Decree of Divorce or any subsequent modification 
thereto. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
7. Attached to this Memorandum is a copy of the check made payable to 
Karen Woods in the amount of$2,000.00 dated Aprill5, 1997. (Quiet Title R: 21-
22) 
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8. Raymond Wood and Colleen Wood were married on the 26th day of 
August, 1998 in Carbon County, Utah. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
9. On the 17th day of July 2000, Raymond Wood passed away. (See 
probate# 003700013 EI) (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
10. Upon the death of Raymond Wood, the Defendant herein, Colleen 
Wood, the surviving spouse, was appointed the personal representative of the Estate 
of Raymond Wood. (See attached Order). (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
11. A Notice to All Creditors was published in the Emery County 
Progress as provided in Section 75-3-801(1) of the Utah Code. (See probate# 
003700013 EI) (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
12. Karen Wood failed to file Notice of Claim against the estate of 
Raymond Wood. (See probate# 003700013 EI) (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
13. Colleen Wood then filed a Motion to Deny Creditor's Claim and 
served notice of the motion on Karen Wood. (See probate# 003700013 EI) (Quiet 
Title R: 21-22) 
14. Judge Halliday ruled on the motion on the 1Oth of August 2001. Judge 
Halliday ordered that Karen Wood's claim be denied and ordered that the deed be 
recorded. (See attached Order) (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
15. No appeal of the decision was filed. (See probate# 003700013 EI) 
(Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
16. The Plaintiff Karen Wood was aware of her right to appeal the adverse 
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ruling of the probate court and consciously decided not to pursue the appeal. A copy 
of a letter is attached hereto wherein Karen Wood acknowledges the time 
limitations on the filing of an appeal. See attached letter dated September, 7, 2001 
addressed to David and McKette Allred. (Quiet Title R: 21-22) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Karen Wood and Raymond Wood were divorced pursuant to a Decree of 
Divorce entered by the District Court on the 9111 day of April, 1987. The District 
Comi granted to Raymond Wood the real property located in Orangeville, Emery 
County, State of Utah which was the only real property which the parties owned. In 
addition, the Trial Court granted to each of the parties certain items of personal 
property and then granted a judgment to Karen Wood (Appellant) of$10,000.00 to 
equalize the equities in the real and personal property awarded to each of the parties. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 75-2-804 specifically severs the interest of a 
spouse in property held at the time of divorce or annulment as joint tenants with 
right of survivorship. 
After Raymond Wood's death, Karen Wood failed to make any claim against 
the Estate of Raymond Wood in the probate proceedings until after the personal 
representative filed a motion to deny creditor's claims. Judge Halliday entered an 
order in August of 2001 ordering that Karen Wood was not entitled to any claims 
against the Estate of Raymond Wood. 
The ruling in the probate case went unappealed by Karen Wood. The Decree 
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of Divorce entered by the divorce court in 1987 went unappealed by Karen Wood. 
The award of real property to Raymond Wood in the divorce action and the 
denial of any claim for reimbursement of money to Karen Wood in the probate case 
now precludes Karen Wood from relief in her Quiet Title action wherein Karen 
Wood seeks the Order of the Court that a right of survivorship was in effect and that 
she should be awarded all interest in the real property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE 
REAL PROPERTY IS RESOLVED PURSUANT TO THE 
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. 
Raymond Wood and Karen Wood were divorced pursuant to a Decree of 
Divorce signed the 9th day of April, 1987. A complete copy ofthe Decree of 
Divorce is attached in Addendum A. 
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is the division of the marital assets and 
reads as follows: 
5. That the marital assets be divided between the parties as 
follows: 
A. To Defendant: the 1974 mobile home and the real 
property located in Orangeville, Emery County, and subject to the 
indebtedness thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the 
indebtedness thereon; the 1975 Dodge 4-wheel drive pickup truck; 
1978 5th wheel camp trailer; the Century boats; the 1982 Honda ATC 
3-wheeler; the dirt bike; the snowmobiles; and a potiion of the 
furniture and furnishings. 
B. To Plaintiff: the 1978 Subaru automobile; a portion 
19 
of the furniture and furnishings; Plaintiff's personal belongings and 
those of the minor children. 
C. That Plaintiff shall and hereby is granted judgment 
against Defendant in the amount ofTen Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00), the same being approximately one-halfofthe equity in 
those items outlined herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said 
judgment shall earn interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. 
The only real property referred to in the Decree of Divorce is the real 
property located in Orangeville, Emery County and is the real property at issue in 
this Appeal. 
The parties later filed Counter Petitions in the Divorce action to modify 
which resulted in a Stipulation signed by the parties and filed in the divorce action 
on April28, 1997. The Stipulation is 5 paragraphs long. A copy of the Stipulation is 
attached as Addendum A. The 5 paragraphs read as follows: 
1. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of$5,600.00 
payable $2,000.00 on or before Aprill5, 1997 with the balance of 
$3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 the first payment being 
due on or before April 30,1997 and like payments being due on or 
before the end of each month thereafter. Monthly payment shall be 
made by direct deposit from Defendant's bank account into Plaintiff's 
account and Defendant shall bear all costs associated with the 
arranging of said deposits. 
2. As long as the payments herein agreed are timely made, 
no interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance due. In the event 
any payment is not timely made; interest at the annual rate of 12% 
shall computed from the date of this agreement and Plaintiff, upon 
filing of an affidavit with the Court that payments have not been timely 
made~, shall be entitled to judgment against Defendant for the balance 
owed, including accrued interest and attorney's fees incurred in the 
preparation and filing of the Affidavit and judgment. Prior to filing an 
Affidavit with the Court set forth in this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give 
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to Defendant ten (10) days advance written notice of the delinquency. 
3. Upon, the execution of this agreement, Plaintiff shall 
place with her attorney, Michael A. Harrison, an original, executed 
Quit Claim Deed to the property awarded to Defendant in the parties' 
Decree of Divorce, Michael A. Harrison shall deliver the Deed to 
Defendant upon payment of all sums due hereunder or to a Title 
Company within the event said Deed is necessary to enable Defendant 
to refinance his property in order to satisfy his obligations hereunder. 
4. Upon the execution of this Stipulation, Defendant's 
Petition to Modify and Petitioner's Counter Petition, Amended 
Counter Petition and Order to Show Cause shall be dismissed and a 
Trial date now scheduled for Friday, February 7, 1997 be vacated. 
5. Each party hereby releases the other from any and all 
obligations that may exist, or may, in the future, exist under the terms 
of the parties' Decree of Divorce or any subsequent modification 
thereto. 
This Court is called upon to interpret the Decree of Divorce and subsequent 
Stipulation as set out above but no where in the language is there any reference to a 
Right of survivorship in the property being preserved. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-804 entitled Definition reads as follows: 
75-2-804. Definitions - Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers 
by divorce - Effect of severance - Revival - Protection of payors, third 
parties, and bona fide purchasers- Personal liability of recipient- No 
revocation by other changes of circumstances. 
(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a 
court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made 
between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or 
annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: 
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(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the 
time of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the Right of 
survivorship, transforming the interests of the former spouses into tenancies 
mcommon. 
The statutory provisions set out above specifically severs Karen Wood's 
right to the property unless there is an express term of a governing instrument, a 
Court order or a contract providing for a Right of survivorship. No where in the 
language in the Decree of Divorce or Stipulation of the parties is there an express 
provision providing for a Right of survivorship of Karen Wood in the property at 
issue, nor has Karen Wood made claim in her opposition to summary judgment or in 
her brief that there exists such a written document. 
POINT II 
PAYMENT OF THE MONEY ORDERED PURSUANT TO THE 
DIVORCE PROCEEDING WOULD RESOLVE ALL CLAIMS 
AND PROVIDE A CLEAR DEFENSE AGAINST KAREN 
WOOD'S CLAIMS TO QUIET TITLE. 
The Decree of Divorce nor the subsequent Stipulation contemplated that 
Karen Wood would be entitled to be paid the judgment and in addition be entitled to 
ownership in the real property. The Stipulation attached in Addendum A provides 
that upon payment of the money as agreed in the Stipulation that Raymond Wood 
would be entitled to force Michael Harrison to turn over the Quit Claim Deed held 
in his possession. The judicial determination of whether Raymond Wood owed 
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Karen Wood any money pursuant to the parties' Stipulation was adjudicated in the 
Probate Court. The Probate Court determined that Raymond Wood did not owe any 
money to Karen Wood. (Probate R:ll4-115) 
The Quiet Title action filed by Karen Wood is not a Quiet Title action where 
you have competing claims because of discrepancy in property description; or 
claims based upon adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence. The position 
taken by Karen Wood is that she claims that she was not paid the money owed 
pursuant to the parties' Stipulation and therefore mistakenly believes she is entitled 
to the windfall of complete ownership in the property. 
POINT III 
THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS PROVIDED THE 
APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR KAREN WOOD TO 
ADJUDICATE HER ENTITLEMENT TO PAYMENT OF MONEY 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. 
Raymond Wood died on the 171h day of July, 2000. (Probate R: 01) Prior to 
Raymond Wood's death, Karen Wood might have sought the help and assistance of 
the divorce court had she believed that there was a claim for nonpayment of the 
monies owed. Karen Wood's remedies for nonpayment of the amounts agreed upon 
pursuant to the parties' Stipulation are quite clearly outlined in paragraph 2 of the 
Stipulation attached in Addendum A which reads, in pertinent part: 
In the event any payment is not timely made, interest at the 
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annual rate of 12% shall be computed from the date of this agreement 
and Plaintiff, upon filing of an Affidavit with the Court that payments 
have not been timely made, shall be entitled to judgment against the 
Defendant for the balance owed including accrued interest and 
attorney's fees incurred in the preparation and filing of the Affidavit 
and judgment. Prior to filing an Affidavit with the Court as set forth in 
this paragraph, Plaintiff shall give to Defendant advance written notice 
of the delinquency. 
The Stipulation provided for $2,000.00 to be paid on or before Aprill5, 
1997 and the balance of$3,600.00 in monthly payments of$100.00 beginning April 
30, 1997. If all of the payments were timely made, the final payment would have 
been made on or before March 30, 2000. Raymond Wood did not pass away until 
July 17, 2000 which would have been nearly four months after the scheduled final 
payment pursuant to the parties' Stipulation. 
During said nearly four month period of time, Karen Wood did not send 
written notice of any delinquency (or at least has not made any attempt to assert in 
any ofthe proceedings that she had sent any notice to Raymond Wood of a 
delinquency) nor did she return to the District Court in the divorce proceedings to 
make any attempt to obtain a judgment as allowed pursuant to their Stipulation. 
Once Raymond Wood passed away, the appropriate forum for Karen Wood to 
assert any claims that she had for payment of money would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Probate Court, yet again Karen Wood did not make any attempt to 
file a claim or assert a claim that any monies were still owed to her pursuant to the 
parties' Stipulation. There was no effort on the part of Karen Wood to assert her 
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claims for payment of money until after the filing of the Personal Representatives 
motion to Deny Creditors Claim. 
The Probate Court determined that Karen Wood had not timely filed her 
creditor's claim and therefore denied any claims for money owed by the Estate of 
Raymond Wood. The Order denying Karen Wood's claim went unappealed and has 
been in place since the 1oth day of August, 2001. (Probate R: 114-115) 
Had Karen Wood timely asserted her claims in the divorce proceedings prior 
to Raymond Wood's death or even in a timely manner after Raymond Wood's death 
pursuant to a creditor's claim, then the Court could have received evidence from 
Karen Wood as to payments that had been made or payments that had not been made 
but because of her untimeliness the Court has denied her right to seek any claims 
against Raymond Wood's Estate which carries the same result as if the Court had 
made a finding that all payments had been made pursuant to the parties' Stipulation. 
It becomes even more apparent that the District Court reached the appropriate 
results in light of the following example. If one assumes that Karen Wood had 
timely asserted her claims either in the divorce proceedings or in the probate 
proceedings and the Court for purposes of example determined that $500.00 had not 
been paid pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, then an appropriate judgment would 
have been entered and either Raymond Wood or his Estate would have paid the 
$500.00 or Karen Wood would have been entitled to execute on the property of the 
Estate for which she may or may not have chosen to foreclose on the real property. 
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In the event, the Court allowed a foreclosure, any amounts above the amount owed to 
Karen Wood would have been paid back to the Estate of Raymond Wood. 
POINT IV 
THE RULING BY THE PROBATE COURT THAT KAREN 
WOOD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY MONEY FROM THE 
ESTATE OF RAYMOND WOOD PRESENTED A COMPLETE 
DEFENSE TO KAREN WOOD'S QUIET TITLE ACTION. 
The denial of Karen Wood's claims against the Estate of Raymond Wood has 
the same effect as an adjudication by the Probate Court that all monies owed 
pursuant to the divorce stipulation had been paid by Raymond Wood. Karen Wood 
asserts as part of her Quiet Title action that inasmuch as she claims that she was not 
paid the money owed to her, that she is entitled to maintain a Right of survivorship 
in the property. It becomes, perhaps even more apparent, that had Karen Wood 
asserted her claims in the divorce proceedings prior to Raymond Wood's death and 
had the divorce court determine that $5,600.00 as set out in the parties' Stipulation 
had been paid to Karen Wood there would be little question as to the resolution in 
the Quiet Title action. The divorce court clearly would have had the ability to 
determine that all payments had been made to Karen Wood and that she was not 
entitled to claims against any of the marital property of Raymond Wood. Because 
the probate Court was the forum to determine whether payments had been made or 
not does not change the end result that any claims that Karen Wood has to the real 
property are a function of whether she was entitled to any money under the parties' 
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Stipulation. Because the Probate Court determined that Karen Wood was not 
entitled to any money from the Estate of Raymond Wood the ruling in the Probate 
Court is res judicata and precludes recovery by Karen Wood in a Quiet Title action. 
(See argument as set out in the original Motion for Summary Judgment attached in 
Addendum A for a more expanded discussion regarding the res judicata effect of the 
rulings in the divorce and probate actions.) 
POINTV 
DELIVERY OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED BY KAREN WOOD 
TO HER ATTORNEY PRECLUDES HER FROM LATER 
FILING A SURVIVOR AFFIDAVIT OR FURTHER 
CONVEYANCE OF THE SAME PROPERTY. 
Even if the Court were to reach the conclusion that the Decree of Divorce did 
not sever the Right of survivorship to Karen Wood then the subsequent Stipulation 
in the divorce proceedings entered into on the 251h day of April, 1997 with the 
accompanying transfer of an original Quit Claim Deed signed by Karen Wood to her 
attorney Michael Harrison would have severed any right of survivorship. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-13 states in pertinent part: 
A Quit Claim Deed, when executed as required by law, shall 
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and estate 
of the grantor in and to the premises therein prescribed and all right, 
privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging, at the date of the 
conveyance. 
Pursuant to the parties' Stipulation, Karen Wood signed a Quit Claim Deed 
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for the property at issue and delivered the Deed to Michael A. Harrison her attorney. 
Mr. Harrison, pursuant to the Stipulation was instructed to deliver the Deed to 
Defendant upon payment of all sums due or to enable Mr. Wood to refinance his 
property in order to satisfY his obligations pursuant to the Stipulation. The exact 
language of the Stipulation is contained in paragraph 3 and cited verbatim in the 
Statement of Facts herein. The delivery of the Quit Claim Deed to her attorney 
Michael Harrison constituted a valid delivery of the Deed and precludes Karen 
Wood from any further transfer including the filing of a Right of survivorship to the 
property. The act of signing the Quit Claim Deed and delivering it to Michael 
Harrison to hold pending payment of the monies agreed in the Stipulation 
specifically in itself severs any Right of survivorship. The Utah Court of Appeals in 
Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah App. 1994) ruled: 
I. Dissolution of Joint Tenancy 
When a joint tenant makes "a bona fide conveyance of his 
inteTest in property to a third party, ... this has the effect of 
terminating the joint tenancy, and converting the ownership into a 
tenancy in common." Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah 
1979); accord Clearfield State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622, 624-25 
(Utah 1977); Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 
P .2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1956) Goint tenant who conveys or mortgages 
reall property terminates joint tenancy and creates tenancy in 
common). 
"Either party to a joint tenancy may terminate it ... and ... the 
consent of the other tenants to the severance or termination is not 
required." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy§ 16 at 343 (1981); accord 
Nelson, 592 P.2d at 596, 597; Clearfield State Bank, 562 P.2d at 
624-25. 
The valid conveyance itself destroys the joint tenancy, and a 
joint tenant need not notifY the other tenant or record the conveyance. 
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See Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90-91 
(Cal. App. 1968) ("It was unnecessary in connection with the 
execution of such a deed that there should be notification to the other 
joint tenant and unnecessary that the deed be recorded; neither 
acknowledgment {876 P.2d 879} or recordation is necessary."); 48A 
C.J.S. Joint Tenancy§ 17 at 345. 
"Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic or major incident 
of an estate in joint tenancy." 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3 at 302. 
However, survivorship is an expectancy and not a future interest 
because a joint tenant has but a "conditional opportunity of becoming 
the owner of the whole interest." Estate ofBreckon v. Tax Comm'n, 
591 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1979). 
"The effect of a severance by a joint tenant is to terminate the 
incident of survivorship as between him and the other joint tenants." 
48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy§ 19 at 351 (citing Tracy-Collins, 301 P.2d 
at 1090); accord 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership§§ 14 
& 16 at 108, 109 (1965). 
Accordingly, Mrs. Crowther had no interest in the Property at 
the time of her death, having transferred her interest to Mower, and 
Crowther's ownership interest had already changed from a joint 
tenancy to a tenancy in common. 
II. Effect of Failure to Record 
Crowther argues that Mrs. Crowther did not convey her interest 
because Mower failed to record the deed prior to her death, or 
alternatively, that Mrs. Crowther did not intend to transfer her 
interest. We disagree. 
A quit claim deed, "when executed as required by law shall have 
the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the 
grantor in and to the premises therein described and all rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of such 
conveyance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 (1994). The fact that such a 
deed is not recorded or that recording is delayed "does not affect the 
validity of a document with respect to the parties to the document and 
all other persons who have notice of the document." Utah Code Ann. § 
57-3-2(3). In fact, Utah's recording laws "do not make recordation a 
prerequisite to the validity of a deed." Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 
396, 398 (Utah 1983) (unrecorded deed valid against interest of 
subsequent buyers who failed to record their own interest); Tarpey v. 
Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P. 338, 339 (Utah 1887) 
(unrecorded conveyance valid between parties and to all parties having 
actual notice), affd, 142 U.S. 241, 12 S. Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 
29 
(1891). Nor is compliance with the recording statute necessarily a 
prerequisite to enforcing the terms of the deed. Larson v. Overland 
Thrift & Loan, 818 P .2d 1316, 1323 (Utah App. 1991 ); cert. denied, 
832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
POINT VI 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WAS GRANTED BY THE QUIET 
TITLE COURT NOT BY THE PROBATE COURT. 
Karen Wood asserts that the District Court committed error because the 
Probate Court should not enter a ruling in a Quiet Title action. Karen Wood 
misconstrues the procedural status of the files at the time of the entry of the Ruling 
on Summary Judgment. The probate case which is Case No. 003700013 EI was 
originally presided over by Judge Halliday. The Quiet Title action which bears Civil 
No. 0107700169 was originally assigned to Judge Bryner. The Motion to 
Consolidate the cases and for Summary Judgment were filed in the Quiet Title 
action Civil No. 010700169 seeking to consolidate the Quiet Title action into the 
previously filed probate case before Judge Halliday. 
In fact, pursuant to the Order on Order to Show Cause at record 172-173, 
Judge Halliday makes the following Order on Order to Show Cause which reads in 
pertinent part: 
1. The Court recognizes that there is an associated case 
wherein Karen Wood has filed a Quiet Title action which bears case 
no 0107700169 and is set before Judge Bryner. 
2. The Court recognizes that Colleen Wood Davis has filed 
a motion asking Judge Bryner to consolidate the Quiet Title action 
into this probate action and further has filed a motion for summary 
judgment. 
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3. Until Judge Bryner rules on the Motion to Consolidate, 
this Court will not enter a ruling with regard to the Quiet Title action, 
but merely will leave the prior rulings of this Court in place until the 
Motion to Consolidate has been ruled upon by Judge Bryner. 
The Order on Order to Show Cause was signed by Judge Halliday on the 29th 
day of October, 2002. The principle Memorandum in support of the Motion to 
Consolidate and for Summary Judgment as well as Karen Wood's Memorandum in 
opposition and the Reply Memorandum were all filed in the Quiet Title action. 
Judge Bryner then ruled on the Motion to Consolidate which ruling is set out on 
page 98 of the record wherein Judge Bryner rules as follows: 
The Motion to Consolidate the above entitled case with 
Probate No. 003700013EI was granted in order to maintain 
consistency. The Motion for Summary Judgment shall be ruled on by 
the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, Judge of the Seventh District Court, 
who is hearing the said probate case. 
Subsequent thereto, on the 22"d of January, 2003, Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
entered his ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment as set out in the Order of 
Dismissal contained at record page 1 00-1 0 1. 
The claim by Karen Wood that the Probate Court was without jurisdiction to 
determine Karen Wood's claim to real property is mistaken. At the time that Judge 
Halliday ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment, he was sitting as the judge not 
only in the probate case but also in the Quiet Title action inasmuch as both matters 
had been consolidated and assigned to Judge Halliday for consideration. 
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POINT VII 
THERE WERE NO AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. THE MATTER WAS DECIDED BASED UPON 
PRIOR RULINGS IN THE DOMESTIC AND PROBATE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Karen Wood asserts in her Brief that the Affidavits of the personal 
representative should not be considered in that she believes they are defective 
because they are not made upon personal knowledge. 
The Quiet Title action contains all of the memorandums submitted by the 
personal representative in support of the Motion for Consolidation and for Summary 
Judgment. The Court can review the record which will show that there were no 
affidavits of the personal representative Colleen Wood submitted in support of the 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The basis for the Summary Judgment was based 
upon the record in the divorce proceedings as to the parties' Stipulation and the 
record in 1he Probate matter denying the creditor's claim of Karen Wood. 
POINT VIII 
IN ORDER FOR THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP TO BE 
PRESERVED THERE MUST BE A WRITING. 
The final argument made by Karen Wood in her brief asserts that regardless 
of the language in the Stipulation in the divorce proceedings, it was the parties intent 
to leave the Right of survivorship in place. The clear language of the written 
documents leads one to the opposite conclusion as set out in the ruling by Judge 
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Halliday. The statute sited in Point I requires a written document which outlines the 
parties intent to maintain a right of survivorship and that in the absence of such a 
writing that there can be no right of survivorship preserved. The Appellate Court can 
reach its own conclusions based upon the reading of the Decree of Divorce and 
Stipulation of the parties. The clear language of the Divorce Decree and Stipulation 
do not make any provision for a right of survivorship and therefore the District 
Court acted properly in granting summary judgment. 
POINT IX 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE ENTITLED 
TO COLLECT HER ATTORNEY'S FEES HEREIN. 
Pursuant to the Court's Order denying creditor's claim in the probate matter, 
paragraph 5 (R. 115) the personal representative was awarded her attorney's fees. 
The personal representative asked the Court as part of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment for an award of attorney's fees. Judge Halliday did not address the issue 
in his Order granting summary judgment. 
The substance ofthis appeal is a request on the part ofKaren Wood to 
interpret the Orders in the divorce proceedings with regard to her right to 
survivorship in the marital real property. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3, 
the Court has the ability in domestic cases to order the payment of attorney's fees 
and the personal representative requests that the Court awarded the Estate its fee. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellee respectfully requests this Court to confirm the decision of Judge 
Halliday in granting summary judgment and requests that the Court of Appeals award 
the personal representative or the Estate of Raymond Wood her costs and attorney's 
fees herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUB MITT~ ~~:Jay Lf;ary, 2004. 
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Attorney for Defendant and Appellee 
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